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ABSTRACT. The individualist nature of much contemporary just war theory
means that we often discuss cases with single attackers. But even if war is best
understood in this individualist way, in war combatants often have to make
decisions about how to distribute harms among a plurality of aggressors: they
must decide whom and how many to harm, and how much to harm them. In this
paper, I look at simultaneous multiple aggressor cases in which more than one
distribution of harm among aggressors is available. I show how such cases pose
deep questions concerning the nature, role, and scope of the necessity principle,
and its relationship to both liability and narrow proportionality. I argue that a
hitherto unrecognised measure – ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’ – and its dis-
tribution is relevant in choosing how to distribute harms across aggressors. I then
extend this analysis to show how this may help us with a puzzle concerning
sequential attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the ethics of war and self-defence will often employ
cases in which one attacker threatens one victim. There is much that
we can learn from such cases. But war involves many people
attacking many people, and so there are some questions, including
those concerning distributing harms among culpable or responsible
threats, that do not arise in these single-aggressor cases. Here I
investigate cases involving more than one aggressor, focusing on
cases of multiple simultaneous threats in which more than one
distribution of harm is available. Our central question is this: How
should we distribute harm among aggressors?
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The paper is an exploration of this topic. Several different issues
will be investigated, and some new ideas floated. What draws these
different issues and ideas together is that I try to show how con-
sideration of this question about distributing harm among aggressors
can raise deeper questions about, and help us to clarify our views
concerning, the relationships between some key concepts. Most
importantly, since it is usually thought to be the necessity principle’s
job to compare our defensive options, this topic poses some
important, and under-investigated, questions about the necessity
principle. These include important questions about necessity’s rela-
tionship to liability and narrow proportionality, and the scope of the
necessity principle’s application, which is possibly a lot more
expansive than has been traditionally thought. Having explored these
issues through simultaneous-aggressor cases, I then show how the
positions reached potentially have implications for a puzzle gener-
ated by sequential threat cases.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I introduce some
key concepts. In Section III, I introduce two key claims about lia-
bility – that necessity is internal to liability, and that liability is a one-
to-one relation. In Section IV, through considering multiple-aggres-
sor cases, I seek to show that at least one of these claims is false.
Sections V and VI investigate the scope of the necessity principle.
Once we accept some seemingly uncontroversial claims about
necessity’s role in distributing harms across attackers, it becomes
very difficult to cordon off necessity from having radical implica-
tions. Section VII concerns the relationship between narrow pro-
portionality and necessity. I argue that necessity ought to take
account of something I call ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’. This
analysis is extended by Section VIII in which I argue that necessity
must take account of distributive concerns, including the distribution
of narrow proportionality shortfall. Section IX takes some key les-
sons from simultaneous-aggressor cases and applies them to a puzzle
concerning sequential aggressors. Section X concludes.
II. LIABILITY, NARROW PROPORTIONALITY, AND NECESSITY:
THE BASIC MODEL
There are, broadly speaking, two categories of people we might
subject to defensive harm: those who are innocent (at least with
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regard to the present situation) and those who are not. There are, of
course, many finer distinctions we could make, and there are, of
course, disputes about how and where to draw the line. Neverthe-
less, the line is an important one – whether we are harming an
innocent bystander or a liable party makes a big moral difference. In
this paper, I focus on harms to culpable and responsible aggressors:
people who pose an unjustified threat, and bear enough responsi-
bility for that threat to be considered potentially liable to harm.
Three key concepts will be referred to throughout – liability, narrow
proportionality, and necessity. The paper is in part an investigation of
the relationships between these concepts, particularly in contexts in
which we face a plurality of potentially liable aggressors.
When someone is responsible for an unjustified threat, they are
standardly thought to have forfeited some of their rights against
harm. This means that they are potentially liable to some defensive
harm. When we are liable to harm, we have no complaint against it,
and are not wronged by it. However, as Jonathan Quong puts it, ‘a
person is never liable to defensive harm generally; rather, a person
can only be liable to some particular proportionate level of defensive
harm.’1 Narrow proportionality concerns the proportionality of harms
with a liability justification. It sets a maximum limit to the harm that
may be done to someone under that justification, and is based on a
variety of factors, including the level of harm threatened and the
aggressor’s level of responsibility.2 Narrow proportionality contrasts
with wide proportionality, which concerns the proportionality of
harms done to the innocent with a lesser-evil justification.3
Some people think that, at least in some contexts, when people
forfeit their rights they forfeit their rights all the way up to the
maximum set by narrow proportionality. For example, Kit Wellman
distinguishes between strong and weak rights forfeiture, and en-
dorses strong rights forfeiture in the context of punishment.4
According to this view, a criminal may be punished up to the nar-
1 Jonathan Quong, ‘Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 43
(2015): 144–173, at pp. 144–145.
2 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 19–29; David Rodin,
‘Justifying Harm,’ Ethics 122 (2011): 74–110. Quong denies that responsibility is a factor (‘Proportion-
ality, Liability, and Defensive Harm’).
3 McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 19–29.
4 Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,’ Ethics 122 (2012):
371–393, at p. 375.
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rowly proportionate maximum, regardless of whether this punish-
ment achieves some further good.
However, most, perhaps all, philosophers working on self-defence
and war believe in a principle of necessity. This means that they do
not endorse strong forfeiture (in Wellman’s sense) in those defensive
contexts. In their eyes, narrowly proportionate defensive harms can
be impermissible, even when they do no harm to anyone but the
responsible threat. In order to be permissible, defensive harm must
also be necessary as part of the defensive action. The necessity
principle applies most clearly in this kind of case: Imagine I can only
fend off an attacker with 20 units of harm. This is narrowly pro-
portionate, and it is thus permissible. But now imagine that a new
option becomes available, and I can also fend off the attacker with
only 10 units of harm. In that case, the 20-unit option includes
unnecessary harm, and is thus impermissible. Since using the 20-unit
option would involve more harm to the same person to achieve the
same end, we can say that this is a case of gratuitous harm.5
Necessity and proportionality, as I understand them here, perform
two distinct tasks. Options that would require excessive force given
the threat faced are ruled out as disproportionate. Proportionality
therefore compares our defensive options with allowing the threat to
eventuate. Necessity selects from among our proportionate defen-
sive options: Options that would require excessive force given our
other proportionate defensive options are ruled out as unnecessary.
Necessity therefore compares our defensive options with one an-
other.
The principle of necessity is not only a principle that limits lia-
bility-justified harms. It also limits lesser-evil-justified harms. While I
will focus on the relationship between liability and necessity here, it
is worth remembering that our account of necessity must suitably
limit harmful actions under both justifications.
While there is widespread agreement on the requirements of
necessity in cases of gratuitous harm, like the one above, there are
nevertheless philosophical controversies concerning the principle.
For example, there are more complex cases in which it is less easy to
determine whether necessity applies and what it requires – the
necessity principle is potentially a lot more complex than we might
5 I am grateful to Kim Ferzan and an anonymous referee here.
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think from cases of gratuitous harm, and, as we shall see, its rela-
tionship to liability is also a matter of controversy.6
III. TWO CLAIMS ABOUT LIABILITY
In this section I want to outline two claims about liability. In short
form, they are as follows:
Claim 1: Necessity is internal to liability
Claim 2: Liability is a one-to-one relation
I’ll explain each in turn. The first claim, that necessity is internal to
liability, is essentially the claim that aggressors are wronged by
unnecessary harms, since they are not liable to unnecessary harms.
Crucially, this means that what harm one is liable to is in part a
matter of what harm is necessary. Others believe that necessity is
external to liability. That is, aggressors are liable to narrowly
proportionate though unnecessary harms, but it is nevertheless
impermissible to impose them. Therefore, while the defensive agent
who imposes unnecessary harm acts impermissibly, she does not
wrong her aggressor, and the unnecessary harm does not give rise to
a complaint.7
The second claim is that liability is a ‘one-to-one relation.’ This is
a claim that liability is only concerned with the attacker and their
attack. For example, Jeff McMahan states that ‘Liability justifications
appear to work by ‘‘pairwise comparisons’’ – that is, by considering
each choice between harmings [that is, whether the attacker or the
victim is harmed] on its own and determining which of the parties
the unavoidable harm ought, as a matter of justice, to be imposed.
(This is part of the explanation of why narrow proportionality does
not take account of numbers).’8 David Rodin claims that ‘Liability is
6 Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 3–44; Jeff
McMahan, ‘The Limits of Self-Defense’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber, eds., The Ethics of Self-
Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
7 For overviews of these issues, see: Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), ch. 4; Joseph Bowen, ‘Necessity and Liability: On an Honour-Based Justification for Defensive
Harming,’ Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2016): 79–93.
8 Jeff McMahan, ‘Liability, Proportionality, and the Number of Aggressors,’ in Saba Bazargan and
Samuel Rickless, eds., The Ethics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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a localized comparison between persons in a situation of con-
flict…values outside that relationship are irrelevant.’9
Here, then, is a commonly accepted claim about liability – it is a
one-to-one relation. However, consideration of multiple aggressor
cases should lead us, I will argue, to either reject this claim or to
downgrade its importance.
IV. NECESSITY AND LIABILITY
Consider this simultaneous threat case:
Case 1: Victim is attacked by two unconnected persons simultaneously, who both intend to kill
her, and will do so unless she defends herself. Both are equally responsible. Repelling either
attack will cause the other attacker to abandon their attack. Attacker 1 can be repelled with 10
units of harm. Attacker 2 can be repelled with 20 units of harm. Both amounts of harm would be
narrowly proportionate.
Proponents of strong rights-forfeiture would appear to be committed
to the idea that it is permissible to harm Attacker 1, Attacker 2, or
both. Since both have forfeited their rights, and there is no necessity
condition, both are liable to be harmed up to the proportionate
maximum. Most will not accept this conclusion. Most will argue that
Victim may harm Attacker 1 and only Attacker 1. Why? Because this
minimizes harm. Since the instruction to harm Attacker 1 is an
instruction to minimize harm from within the proportionate options,
it seems to be the necessity condition that requires Victim to harm
Attacker 1 and not Attacker 2.
This is not a case of gratuitous harm, since the two potential
harms are to two different people. It is a case of how to distribute
harm between two liable parties. But it seems that necessity nev-
ertheless has something to say (and most would accept that it is
necessity that applies here – after all, if necessity had nothing to say
whenever harms might befall different persons, it would hardly apply
at all in the context of war). Yet, if necessity does apply here, this
case tells us something very important about necessity and its rela-
tionship to liability.
Recall that it is often thought that necessity is internal to liability
(Claim 1), and that liability is a one-to-one relation (Claim 2). But if it
9 David Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm,’ p. 99. Rodin doesn’t here use the language of one-to-one rela-
tionships, but I think it is a plausible way to read this claim, given his other work, especially on
bloodless invasions. However, even if Rodin has a wider definition of ‘situation of conflict’ in mind, we
will need an account of what is within and what is outside that situation – something which, as I will
show, is tricky to provide.
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is necessity that tells us that we ought to harm Attacker 1 and not
Attacker 2 in Case 1, then at least one of these two claims must be
false. We have a trilemma, in that we cannot, I argue, endorse the
claim that necessity tells us to harm Attacker 1, and Claim 1, and
Claim 2.
In Case 1, if our judgment that Attacker 1 ought to be harmed is
based upon necessity, that judgment can only be reached by com-
paring harms across attackers. The harm to Attacker 2 is unnecessary,
and that level of harm is unnecessary due to the option of inflicting
less harm on somebody else. Therefore, necessity is not simply about
pairwise comparisons. Since necessity is not simply about pairwise
comparisons, then if necessity, in part, determines what harm we’re
liable to (i.e., if Claim 1 is true) then liability is not simply a one-to-
one relation (i.e., Claim 2 is false). If, on the other hand, Claim 2 is
true, and liability can only be established by pairwise comparisons
between each Attacker and Victim, then Claim 1 must be rejected –
necessity is not internal to liability.
We could claim that Attackers 1 and 2 form a ‘unit’, and so this is
a single attack, not two separate attacks. Therefore, liability is not
quite a one-to-one relation, but it is still limited to those involved in
the ‘situation of conflict’. In order to claim this, a defender of this
view will need to give us an account of how to demark ‘situations of
conflict’. But even if they were able to do so, the conjunction of
Claims 1 and 2 would still be in trouble. Consider this case:
Case 2: Attacker attacks Victim threatening to kill her. Victim can defend herself by killing
Attacker, or scratching Bystander.
It seems that necessity would require us to harm Bystander. All else
equal we might think Victim is required to harm Attacker, or let
herself be harmed, over harming Bystander. But all else is not equal
here. Either Victim or Attacker will end up dead, or Victim can very
mildly harm Bystander. Bystander is clearly not part of the ‘situation
of conflict’ (she is, after all, a bystander) and yet necessity seems to
be telling us that she must be harmed. So we again see that necessity
looks across the various harmful options, singling one out. And
again, not all of these harmful options will harm people involved in
the attack. If necessity helps to determine liability, we must reject the
claim that liability is a one-to-one relationship. If liability is a one-to-
one relationship (or involves only those who are part of the situation
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of conflict) we must deny that necessity helps to determine liability.
We could keep Claims 1 and 2 by denying that it is necessity that
tells us who to harm in Case 1 and Case 2. On this picture, necessity
is more limited, focusing simply on what is necessary to stop this
attack (or perhaps it is even more limited, and restricted to ruling out
gratuitous harm only). We might then reason through Case 1 as
follows. The 20-units harm to Attacker 2 is proportionate and nec-
essary. The 10-units harm to Attacker 1 is also proportionate and
necessary. And so both attackers are liable to those amounts of
harm, since necessity and liability both, on this picture, concern this
attacker and the threat that they pose. However, we might think,
there is some further principle, external to liability, which states that,
of the two necessary harms, one is to be chosen over another. This
might be a more general ‘minimizing harm’ principle.
One thing to note here is that by postulating two separate prin-
ciples – necessity, which is internal to liability, and a minimizing
harm principle, which adjudicates between harms to which persons
are liable – this view proposes what seems to be a radical revision to
defensive morality. The job that the minimizing harm principle is
supposed to do is one that necessity has standardly been thought to
do – i.e., selecting the minimally harmful option from among our
proportionate defensive options. Perhaps they are parts of the same
principle – in the way that McMahan has carefully and usefully
distinguished between narrow and wide proportionality, perhaps
there is a difference between narrow and wide necessity. Narrow
necessity is internal to liability, while wide necessity adjudicates
between harms to which persons are liable (and, perhaps, other
harms too).
Here is one potentially attractive entailment of this type of ‘split
necessity’ view: since both Attacker 1 and Attacker 2 are liable, it
allows us to say that if Victim chooses to harm Attacker 1, she acts
impermissibly, but she does not wrong Attacker 1. On this view, you
wrong someone when you do more harm than is necessary to them
to stop their attack, but you do not wrong them when you fail to
minimize harm more generally.
However, this view, as currently stated, cannot save the con-
junction of Claims 1 and 2. To see this, consider Case 1 again. The
position explored above relies on each of the two Attackers being
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liable to harm. But, according to this new view, neither attacker is, in
fact, liable to harm. If necessity is internal to liability, and liability is a
one-to-one relation, then we must look only at the threat each At-
tacker poses, and whether the harm to him is necessary to prevent it.
On this measure, neither harm is narrowly necessary. There is a way
to stop Attacker 1 without harming him at all – namely, harming
Attacker 2 – and there is a way to stop Attacker 2 without harming
him at all – namely, harming Attacker 1. Therefore, to harm either is
to harm him more than is necessary.
The view could be amended, however, to fix this problem.10 If
narrow necessity rules out comparison with options that harm third
parties, then both options in Case 1 are narrowly necessary. In
considering whether it is narrowly necessary to harm Attacker 1, I
cannot appeal to the fact that I could harm Attacker 2, since Attacker
2 is a third party insofar as the threat posed by Attacker 1 is con-
cerned.
This reformulated view, however, also has some concerning
implications. First, consider a case in which I can either kill my
Attacker or run away. Killing the Attacker would be impermissible
and would wrong the Attacker, since it would be narrowly unnec-
essary. But now imagine that my running away would very mildly
harm a Bystander. I would still be morally required to run away, but
now I would not wrong the Attacker by killing him. It seems odd to
say that in both cases I am required not to kill the Attacker, but I
only wrong him in one case. Second, now consider a case in which I
could kill my Attacker, or mildly harm a Bystander, but that harming
the Bystander would have enormous benefits (for example, it would
save my life and five further lives). I would be required to harm the
Bystander, but, on this view, would not wrong my Attacker if I
chose to kill him, since killing him would be narrowly necessary.
Now add an option to run away without harming anyone. According
to the view under consideration, the addition of this impermissible
option, an option I would be morally required to ignore, would make
it the case that I now would wrong my Attacker if I chose to kill him,
since killing him is now not narrowly necessary.
A further general effect of separating necessity into narrow and
wide necessity – with wide necessity operating external to liability –
10 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for comments here.
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is that, as with having an external necessity principle more generally,
this limits the significance of liability: Showing someone is liable, and
that nobody else will be harmed, is not enough to justify harming
them.
There are further worries with the idea that narrow necessity is
internal to liability and that liability is a one-to-one relation. Consider
this case with one attacker and two victims:
Case 3: Attacker attacks Victim 1 and Victim 2. Individually, each attack would license self-
defence up to the narrowly proportionate limit of 10 units of harm. Only shooting the Attacker
in the legs, imposing 15 units of harm, will prevent Attacker from completing his attacks.
Bystander must decide whether to impose 15 units of harm.11
Now, this case may seem unproblematic. Intuitively, we clearly
ought to handle the case as follows. First, the narrowly proportion-
ate limit for the combined attacks is 20 units. Second, the necessary
force is fifteen units. Therefore, the Attacker is liable to 15 units of
force.
But recall that we are investigating the conjunction of the claims
that necessity is internal to liability, and that liability is a one-to-one
relation. The above, intuitive response relies on combining the attacks
to establish liability. However, if Claims 1 and 2 are correct, then
liability for each attack must be established independently (because
liability is one-to-one) and we must establish whether the harm
necessary to stop each attack is narrowly proportionate given the aim
of stopping that attack (since narrow necessity is internal to liability).
So, we first ask whether 15 units is necessary and proportionate for
preventing Attack 1. It is necessary, but not proportionate. And so
Attacker is not liable to that harm in order to prevent Attack 1. The
same is true of Attack 2. And so he is not liable to that harm either.
Since he is not liable to 15 units in order to prevent Attack 1, nor 15
units to prevent Attack 2, he is not liable to 15 units in order to
prevent both attacks.
To be clear, this counter-intuitive outcome is not generated by
assuming that liabilities cannot be aggregated. If, for example, Bys-
tander could prevent the attack by inflicting 10 units that would
prevent Attack 1, and, separately, 10 units that would prevent Attack
2, this would be permissible, since both these harms would be
11 I came to realise this problem with the one-to-one conception of necessity through engaging with
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan’s exploration of liability and desert, ‘Defense and Desert: When Reasons Don’t
Share,’ San Diego Law Review 55 (2018): 265–290. Ferzan’s work in turn engages with Uwe Steinhoff’s
work.
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necessary and proportionate to preventing the particular attack, and so
Attacker would be liable to both. (For example, if Bystander could
shoot Attacker in both arms, independently causing him to drop the
guns that threatens each Victim.) The trouble comes because of the
conjunction of Claims 1 and 2. If necessity were external to liability
(i.e., if Claim 1 were rejected), we could do things in this way:
Attacker is liable to 10 units for Attack 1, and 10 units for Attack 2.
Therefore, he is liable overall to 20 units of harm. A separate prin-
ciple, external to questions of liability, namely necessity, confirms
that the necessary harm of 15 units falls below the total amount of
harm to which he is liable.
However, if we reject Claim 2, and instead seek to establish
Attacker’s joint liability for both attacks, then Attacker is potentially
liable to up to 2o units of harm (combined narrow proportionality)
and actually liable to 15 units (the harm necessary to prevent both
attacks). Liability is established by joining the two attacks together.
Consider, again, what combining Claims 1 and 2 together seems
to require of us.12 Since we must establish liability on a one-to-one
basis, and since we must keep necessity internal to liability, then
liability must be established on a one-to-one basis. Thus, we are
forced to say that 15 units of harm is too much to impose in order to
stop Attack 1 and so is disproportionate. And the same is true of
imposing 15 units in order to stop Attack 2. However, two separate
harms – of 10 units each – would be allowed if they independently
stopped each attack. So, if Claims 1 and 2 are true, then we would be
allowed to impose 20 units of harm on Attacker, but not 15. This is
an odd result, for surely necessity should require us to inflict 15 units
of harm over 20 units of harm in order to achieve the same end.
Our consideration of the above cases reveals the following. First,
necessity (or something like it) must surely consider various harmful
options that spread across attacks. Second, it follows from this that
one of the following is true: (1) liability is not a one-to-one relation,
(2) that necessity is external to liability, or (3) necessity is not the
only principle that helps us to adjudicate between proportionate
defensive options. Third, if (2) or (3) is the case, then there are
external limits on one-to-one liability which seek to limit harm across
attacks. If this is true, the claim that liability is a one-to-one relation is
12 I am grateful to Helen Frowe for useful discussion here.
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less powerful than we initially might be tempted to think. For lia-
bility is not, then, enough to grant us permission to harm, even if
nobody who is not liable is in the frame.
Although I have speculated here that what we call ‘necessity’ may
actually be an amalgamation of concerns or principles, I will largely
leave that speculation behind from this point on. Whatever we call
it, we are morally required to minimize harms among liable
attackers, and this goes beyond the instruction to avoid gratuitous
harm. I want to investigate this requirement further, and will call it
‘necessity’ for ease.
V. SEPARATE ATTACKS
It is tempting to see narrow proportionality and necessity as two
limits on defensive harm, with the main difference between them
being that narrow proportionality is concerned with features of the
threat (‘what you did was out of proportion given the threat I
posed!’) while necessity is concerned with the comparative merits of
the options available to the defensive agent (‘you didn’t need to do
that, you could have done this!’).
We now see, however, that, regardless of whether they are
internal or external to liability, narrow proportionality and necessity
appear to work quite differently in other ways. Narrow propor-
tionality looks at the one-to-one relation between attacker and vic-
tim (though it can be aggregated, as in Case 3), while necessity seeks
to minimize harm across narrowly proportionate defensive options,
sometimes directing us to harm one attacker rather than another (as
in Case 1), or a bystander over an attacker (as in Case 2).
Thus far we have considered cases in which the attacks were in
some senses separate, giving rise to different one-to-one relations,
but the defensive options were linked by producing the same effects.
However, if we extend the analysis thus far, we get some potentially
controversial results. Consider Cases 4 and 5.
Case 4: Attacker 1 attacks Victim, threatening 100 units of harm. The attack can be prevented by
inflicting 100 units of harm on Attacker 1. Attacker 2 also attacks Victim, also threatening 100
units of harm. The attack can be prevented by inflicting 50 units of harm on Attacker 2. Victim
can only prevent one of the attacks.
Case 5: Attacker 1 attacks Victim 1, threatening 100 units of harm. The attack can be prevented
by inflicting 100 units of harm on Attacker 1. Attacker 2 attacks Victim 2, also threatening 100
units of harm. The attack can be prevented by inflicting 50 units of harm on Attacker 2. Neither
victim can prevent the attack against herself or the other, but Bystander can prevent one.
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The analysis thus far suggests that the requirement to minimize
harm stretches across attacks, and attackers. Thus, it would seem to
instruct Victim in Case 4 to inflict 50 units of harm on Attacker 2.
She is going to suffer 100 units of harm either way, and so the
requirement to minimize harm states that she must inflict 50 units of
harm rather than 100 units of harm in order to avoid an additional
100 units of harm to herself. Some may find this counter-intuitive.
They may think both responses are both narrowly proportionate and
necessary, and that Victim can choose as she wishes whom to harm.
Both attackers have made themselves liable and may be harmed. But
the problem with such a view is that it seems to rely on an account
of necessity that was rejected in the previous cases. Cases 1–3 show
that necessity, or something like it, gives us guidance that we ought
to minimize harm across attackers.
This expansive understanding of necessity seems even more
controversial when the attacks are fully separate, as in Case 5. In this
case, our analysis thus far suggests that Bystander ought to save
Victim 2, since doing so minimizes harm and all else is equal.
If we transport this expansive view of necessity to war, we will
generate some very controversial conclusions. On this view of
necessity, if we have two wars we might enter in defence of others,
both of which will do the same amount of good, we would be
required to enter the war which would do the least harm to culpable
aggressors, even though both wars, considered independently, are
necessary and proportionate. This is controversial. Especially since
there is no principled reason to restrict our options to war. Scholars
have noted a controversy about proportionality and what counter-
factual is involved: When states decide to go to war, they need to
compare ‘going to war’ with ‘not going to war’. How, several
philosophers have asked, should we fill out ‘not going to war’? It
could be a very demanding standard: A war might be proportionate
only if the good it achieves compared with the very best options available
to the state is worth the death and destruction involved.13 But
13 David Mellow, ‘Counterfactuals and the Proportionality Criterion,’ Ethics and International Affairs
20 (2006): 439–454; Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality and Necessity’ in Larry May and Emily Crookston
eds., War: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kieran Ober-
man, ‘War and Poverty,’ Philosophical Studies (forthcoming: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s11098-017-1012-4).
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philosophers have been slower to notice that there is also a similar
issue related to necessity.14 Necessity requires us to compare options,
but how should we construct our option set? On the expansive view
currently under discussion, a war might be necessary only if there is
no other way to achieve a comparable level of good or prevention of
harm without causing as much harm. Therefore, necessity demands
that we should, for example, alleviate poverty over going to war.
This may seem overly demanding. We can avoid these
demanding entailments if we allow that necessity can apply across
persons, but demand that it be restricted to a particular ‘situation’. If
we can cordon necessity off in some way, we can say that necessity
only applies to the choice between some options, and not to, for
example, the choice between a war and alleviating poverty. We
might then appeal to some independent ‘minimizing harm’ principle
that advises us (or requires us) to minimize harm, but is not related
to liability. This proposal is attractive. Indeed, some seem to think it
is obviously the way to handle the cases discussed in this paper. I am
attracted to this view, but, as I am going to explain, I think it is hard
to get it to work.
VI. LIMITING NECESSITY’S REACH?
Necessity rules on which of our available options we should take. If
we are to cordon off necessity, preventing it from applying to a
choice between war and alleviating poverty but allowing it to apply
to choices about whether to harm an attacker more or less, we must
have a principled way of determining the scope of the options to
which the necessity principle applies. I think a necessity principle
with a limited scope intuitively offers us the best picture, but finding
the right way to restrict necessity’s reach is difficult. That is what I
want to show in this section. The idea of this section is to lay down a
challenge to anyone who denies that necessity dictates that we ought
to alleviate poverty rather than go to war: How do we restrict
necessity’s reach?
The most obvious way to try to delineate a ‘situation’ or set of
options to which necessity applies is to do with the people involved.
The clearest examples of the necessity principle being breached in-
14 A notable exception here is Kieran Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’; and ‘Killing and Rescuing,’
Philosophical Review 129 (2020). In these papers Oberman argues for a very expansive view of necessity.
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volve harming someone more than we need to. If individuals are
wronged by being harmed unnecessarily, we might try to limit
necessity’s reach by restricting its application to options that harm
the same people. For example, we might try this principle:
Limiting Principle 1: Necessity applies only to options which harm the same persons.
This principle is obviously flawed. First, necessity would not apply in
this case:
Case 6: Attackers 1 and 2 attack Victim. They can be stopped by killing Attacker 1, or by killing
both Attackers.
According to Limiting Principle 1, killing both Attackers would not
be condemned by the necessity principle, since the two options
available harm different sets of people, and so the necessity principle
would not apply across these two options.
Here’s another principle:
Limiting Principle 2: Necessity applies only to options in which some of the same persons will be
harmed.
This principle has four problems. First, necessity would not apply to
the decision in Case 1. Second, this principle would render the jus in
bello necessity condition next-to-toothless. Consider this case:
Case 7: Platoon needs to capture an enemy base. If they attack from the south, they will need to
kill one sentry, Sentry 1. If they attack from the north, they will need to kill Sentries 2-21.
This is a clear case of where we would expect the jus in bello
necessity principle to apply. According to Limiting Principle 2, it
does not. So long as killing 20 enemy soldiers is proportionate, then
Platoon should feel free to attack from the north or the south. We
might try to set aside Case 7 by claiming that since the enemy
soldiers all fight for the same army, this is a special case, and that
necessity can apply to groups of people. But, first, this would fly in
the face of much contemporary just war theory. And, second, we
would no longer be able to compare harms to our own soldiers and
civilians with harms to enemy soldiers and civilians. Third, the
necessity condition would not apply to this case:
Case 8: Country A is threated by Countries B and C. Defending A from either B or C will cause
the other to back off. Country D can defeat B with a loss of 100 of B’s soldiers, or C with a loss of
10,000 of C’s soldiers.
The third problem with Limiting Principle 2 is that necessity should
clearly condemn killing when the same objective can be achieved
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without killing anyone. Limiting Principle 2 only seems to apply to
choices between options in which someone is going to be harmed.
And if we extend it to options in which nobody will be harmed, the
principle will then apply to the choice between killing in war and not
killing and alleviating poverty.
The fourth problem with Limiting Principle 2 is that it is open to
what I will call ‘overlapping problems’. Since I discuss these in more
depth below (concerning overlapping populations of who is to be
saved), I will not detail these issues here.
An alternative to focusing on the parties to be harmed is to limit
necessity’s reach by focusing on the people to be saved. As Kieran
Oberman observes, when we ask whether harm is necessary, it can
only be necessary or unnecessary to achieving some goal.15 Since, in
cases of both self-defence and other-defence, our goal is to save
people, we might try limiting necessity by looking at options which
save the same people. For example, in Case 1, Victim aims to save
herself. How much harm, she might ask, is necessary to achieve this
aim? Therefore, we might use this principle:
Limiting Principle 3: Necessity applies only to options in which the same people are to be saved.
This principle implies that if we could kill Ted to save 100 people, or
kill nobody and save the same 100 plus Bill, necessity would not
dictate that we choose the latter option, since the same people are
not saved in both options. We could amend Limiting Principle 3 to
avoid this implication if we allowed necessity to apply only to
options in which at least the same people are saved (i.e., to options
which save some core group and options Pareto superior to those).
However, even under this revised reading, in a war context,
necessity would have no bearing on this choice:16
Case 9: Country A aims to save Country B from Country C. This involves sending troops into
Country B. A is confident it will win the war, but there will be civilian casualties. If A’s army
enters B from the east, 1000 civilians from the eastern district will be killed. If A enters B from
the west, 10,000 civilians from the western district will be killed.
Here, since different people will be killed, different people will be
saved. If A chooses to enter from the east, the 10,000 westerners who
would be killed under the alternative plan will instead be saved.
We could instead try this principle:
15 Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’; ‘Killing and Rescuing’.
16 For related discussion, see Oberman, ‘War and Poverty’, section 5.
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Limiting Principle 4: Necessity applies only to options in which some of the same people are saved.
Here is my worry with this principle. Consider the following
‘overlap case’:
Case 10: Aggressor attacks Victims 1, 2, 3 and 4. Option 1 saves Victims 1 and 2, at a cost of 10
units of harm to Aggressor. Option 2 saves Victims 2 and 3 at a cost of 100 units. Option 3 saves
Victims 3 and 4 at a cost of 1000 units.
Now, compared pairwise under Limiting Principle 4, necessity says
we must choose Option 1 over Option 2, Option 2 over Option 3,
but that we have a free choice between Options 1 and 3, since
necessity doesn’t apply to that choice. So, necessity doesn’t
necessarily tell us to do anything regarding the choice between
Options 1, 2 and 3. Perhaps this is not a problem: Perhaps necessity is
not an issue of pairwise comparisons, but of comparing a full range
of options. Provided that Option 1 saves some of the same people as
Option 2, and Option 2 saves some of the same people as Option 3,
perhaps necessity applies to the choice between all three options.
However, if we view necessity in that way, then two new worries
arise.
The first is that necessity faces a difficulty from the ‘principle of
irrelevant alternatives’. According to Limiting Principle 4, provided
there is a ‘chain’ of options in which at least some of the same people
are saved in adjacent options, then necessity applies across the whole
range of options. So, in Case 10, you should select Option 1, since
1>2>3. Let’s now remove Option 2. Removing Option 2 which you
weren’t going to choose anyway, means that you now have a free
choice between Options 1 and 3.
More importantly, Limiting Principle 4 does not necessarily mean
that necessity would not apply to a choice between war and allevi-
ating poverty. Often a choice between a war and alleviating poverty
will involve saving at least one person in common. But even if not,
we simply need to be able to construct a ‘chain’ of options (however
morally implausible some of them may be) and the options of war
and alleviating poverty will then become subject to the necessity
constraint. For example, imagine that we are deciding whether to
militarily intervene in Country A or alleviate poverty in Country B.
Provided we also have the (morally implausible) option of devoting
all of our resources to saving only Lukas from Country A and only
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Max from Country B, then necessity applies, according to Limiting
Principle 4, to the choice between war and alleviating poverty.
I don’t have any answers here. My intuitions tell me that, at least
when it comes to harming the potentially liable, necessity is re-
stricted to particular defensive situations. However, it is very hard to
find a principled way of restricting necessity.
VII. NECESSITY AND NARROW PROPORTIONALITY
Necessity and narrow proportionality are usually thought of as
independent tests. Narrow proportionality establishes upper limits
on harm, necessity tells us to minimize harm. Our job as defensive
agents is to check that they coincide: that the option which mini-
mizes harm is below the threshold set by (aggregated) narrow pro-
portionality. In this section, I want to argue that the relationship
between narrow proportionality and necessity is potentially more
complicated than this.
I will argue that whether a harmful action can be deemed nec-
essary involves looking at something I call ‘narrow proportionality
shortfall’. If I am right, this shows two things. First, even if necessity
is external to liability, the relationships between the various concepts
remain complex. We cannot simply say that narrow proportionality
sets an internal limit based on pairwise comparisons, whilst necessity
sets a fully independent external limit that is concerned with
aggregate harm, since narrow proportionality is an important con-
cept in deciding the permissible distribution of harms across a plu-
rality of responsible threats. Second, since necessity is sensitive to
narrow proportionality, this shows that they are two distinct criteria.
This is in contrast to some recent scholarship that has sought to
show that necessity and proportionality are but two sides of the
same coin.17
Consider this case:
Case 11: Victim is attacked by two unconnected persons simultaneously. It is narrowly pro-
portionate to impose 200 units of harm on Attacker 1, and 20 units of harm on Attacker 2.
Repelling either attack will cause the other attacker to abandon their attack. Attacker 1 can be
repelled with 21 units of harm. Attacker 2 can be repelled with 20 units of harm.
In this case, it is more harmful to repel Attacker 1 than Attacker 2.
17 Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War,’ pp. 17–18; Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the
Morality of War,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 34–66, at pp. 37–38.
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So, any view under which necessity merely requires us to minimize
harm, or to minimize priority-weighted harm, would instruct Victim
to harm Attacker 2. But, in my view, necessity instructs Victim to
harm Attacker 1. Seth Lazar and Jeff McMahan argue that necessity
does not demand that we minimize harm (all else equal) but rather
that we minimize morally-weighted harm (all else equal). That is
because when we must choose, for example, between a harm to an
attacker and a slightly lesser harm to an innocent bystander, we
should harm the attacker who has created the situation in which
someone must be harmed.18 My claim here is that harms to culpable
aggressors can also have different moral weightings.
Narrow proportionality represents the maximum possible harm
that can be justified under a liability justification for achieving some
specific good. In Case 11, harming Attacker 1 involves inflicting
roughly one-tenth of the harm to which he is potentially liable.
Repelling Attacker 2 involves inflicting all of the harm to which he is
potentially liable. Necessity should take account of this. Just as
necessity should distinguish between harms done to the innocent
and those done to the liable, so it should distinguish within harms
done to the liable. It can do this if the moral weighting of harm takes
account of what I call the ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’ – that is,
how far short of the maximum potential liability, or narrowly pro-
portionate limit, a harmful action is. In Case 11, the narrow pro-
portionality shortfall of harming Attacker 1 with 21 units is 179. The
narrow proportionality shortfall of harming Attacker 2 with 20 units
is zero. This huge discrepancy in narrow proportionality shortfall
explains why we should harm Attacker 1, even though this does
more harm.
Case 11 shows that necessity is concerned with narrow propor-
tionality shortfall. There are several ways that we might incorporate
this concern with narrow proportionality shortfall into a theory of
necessity. Here are three. First is the extreme view, in which this
concern for narrow proportionality shortfall is the only concern
when considering harms to potentially liable parties. In other words,
there is no concern with absolute levels of harm, and a concern only
with narrow proportionality shortfall. According to this view, nar-
row proportionality sets a baseline against which to measure harm.
18 Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War,’ p. 6; McMahan, ‘The Limits of Self-Defense’.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE FOR AGGRESSORS
Here is how this view would handle Case 11. Since Attacker 1 is
potentially liable to 200 units of harm, the ‘baseline’ against which
we measure harms to him becomes -200 units. Essentially, that
means that we will prefer 200 units of harm to him over a single unit
of harm to an innocent person (whose baseline remains at 0). Only
once we have filled the full quota of harms to which you are
potentially liable will we look at harming an innocent person.
Since Attacker 2 is potentially liable to 20 units of harm, his
baseline becomes -20 units. Therefore, any distribution of harm in
which Attacker 1 has fewer than 180 units of harm is to be preferred
to any distribution in which Attacker 2 is harmed at all, because only
once Attacker 1 has received 180 units of harm will the two be on
equal footing. I think this view has a compelling logic, though it is
counter-intuitive. Should we prefer 180 units of harm to Attacker 1
over one unit of harm to Attacker 2?
Second is the proportion view. In Case 11, 21 units of harm is
roughly 10 percent of what Attacker 1 is potentially liable to, while
20 units of harm is 100 percent of what Attacker 2 is potentially liable
to. We might think necessity dictates that we should prefer which-
ever harm is a lesser proportion of the harm to which the Attacker is
potentially liable. However, this again could generate cases in which
we should prefer hundreds of units of harm to one potentially liable
attacker over a single unit of harm to another.
Third is the mixed view. On this view, the concerns outlined in
either or both of the extreme view and the proportion view are
coupled with a concern to minimize absolute levels of harm. I prefer
this view. But the central point is that, whichever of these we
choose, if we accept that narrow proportionality shortfall matters to
necessity, then the following three things follow. First, this is further
evidence that, if necessity is internal to liability, then liability is not a
one-to-one relation – necessity (and thus liability) chooses which of
the potentially liable persons we should harm, based on facts about
other persons. Second, it shows that necessity and narrow propor-
tionality are independent concepts, one of which informs the other.
Third, it shows that a moral consideration (namely, necessity) prefers
harms that are further away from narrow proportionality thresholds
to those that are close to the maximum liability. If, all else equal,
necessity demands that we maximize narrow proportionality short-
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fall, then it shows morality to be sensitive to how close harms get to
the narrow proportionality threshold. This final point will become
important when we consider sequential aggressor cases.
VIII. NECESSITY AND DISTRIBUTION
Thus far we have largely considered cases in which we must choose
which of multiple simultaneous aggressors we ought to harm.
However, sometimes we might also have choices of harming more
than one aggressor, and different distributions of harm may be
available. For example, consider this case:
Case 12: Victim is attacked by Attacker 1 and Attacker 2. It will be narrowly proportionate to
inflict 100 units of harm on either. Victim has three defensive options: 100 units of harm to
Attacker 1; 100 units of harm to Attacker 2; and 51 units of harm to both.
In my view, Victim ought to harm both with 51 units, even though
this is more harm overall. This cannot be because we must minimize
harm. It also cannot be because of maximizing narrow proportion-
ality shortfall – the total narrow proportionality shortfall of harming
one of the attackers is 100, the total narrow proportionality shortfall
of harming both is 98.
Most straightforwardly, this case shows that we should be con-
cerned not only with harm, but with the distribution of harm. Before
we delve into what this distributive concern is, if we accept that in
Case 12 Victim ought to inflict 51 units of harm on both attackers,
then we face a conceptual choice. One is to fold this distributive
concern (whatever it may be) into necessity – allowing distributive
concerns to affect the moral weighting of harm. Another is to
introduce such concerns as an independent desideratum.19 The cost
of this position, however, is that necessity is relegated from hard
side-constraint to defeasible desideratum, since this independent
distributive concern would allow us to depart from necessity’s rec-
ommendations. Therefore, I think it makes more sense to fold this
concern into necessity.
So, some kind of distributive concern should be added to the
moral weighting of harm. But this doesn’t show that we must be
concerned with (say) an equal distribution of harm. This distributive
concern might itself be sensitive to narrow proportionality shortfall.
Consider the following case:
19 Lars Christie suggested this to me.
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Case 13: Victim is attacked by two unconnected persons simultaneously. It would be narrowly
proportionate to harm Attacker 1 with 40 units of harm, and Attacker 2 with 20 units of harm.
The following defensive options are available. Option A: Both attackers are harmed with 20
units of harm. Option B: Attacker 1 receives 30 units of harm, and Attacker 2 receives 10 units of
harm.
In this case, the total amount of harm (40 units) and the total narrow
proportionality shortfall (20 units) remain constant between the two
options. All that changes is the distribution of harm (in Option A 20-
20, in Option B 30-10), and the distribution of the narrow
proportionality shortfall (in Option A 20-0, in Option B 10-10). My
own view is that necessity requires Option B in this case. Were
necessity focused on minimizing narrowly proportionate harm, we’d
expect it to be indifferent between Options A and B. If necessity
cared about minimizing harm and distributing that harm as equally
as possible, we’d expect it to prefer Option A.
Here are two views which would account for preferring Option
B.
Equality of Narrow Proportionality Shortfall: All else equal, fairness between attackers requires
equalizing the distance from the narrowly proportionate limit of harm to which they are
potentially liable.
Shifted-Baseline Prioritarianism: Units of harm are not equally bad – they get worse the more
harm there is. When someone is potentially liable to some harm, this shifts the ‘baseline’ against
which we measure how bad the harm is. For example, the 201st unit of harm to somebody who
is potentially liable to 200 units of harm should be considered of equal badness to the 21st unit of
harm to someone who is liable to 20 units of harm, and to the first unit of harm to someone
who is not liable to any harm. The first unit of harm to someone who is potentially liable to 20
units of harm equally weighted to the 181st unit to someone who is potentially liable to 200
units.
The idea with Shifted-Baseline Prioritarianism is that harm gets
progressively worse, as in standard prioritarianism,20 but narrowly
proportionate harms are discounted.21 Importantly, though, not all
units of narrowly proportionate harm are given the same discount:
Those closest to the narrowly proportionate limit are given very
little discount. Those further away are given progressively more and
more discount. This position would give us the advantage of caring
both about total harm, and about total narrow proportionality
shortfall (the view that I found most attractive in the previous
section) with one underlying explanation – we care about total
morally weighted and priority-weighted harm, and the priority-weight-
20 Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority? (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1991).
21 This may, therefore, be a specification of Richard Arneson’s ‘Responsibility-Catering Prioritari-
anism.’ Richard J. Arneson, ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,’ Ethics 110 (2000): 339–349.
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ing baseline is shifted by narrow proportionality.
I will not investigate further which of these two options we
should endorse. It may be that which is preferable turns on deeper
questions concerning distributive ethics that I cannot venture into
here, although it may be that narrowly proportionate harms are sui
generis, and we can, say, endorse prioritarianism within the limits of
narrow proportionality while rejecting it outside. Similarly, we may
endorse equality under normal circumstances, but find the idea of
having to make sure we treat attackers fairly unpersuasive.
Instead, I want to draw out several implications of the views
suggested. It seems that both counsel that harms closer to the nar-
row proportionality limit are, in some sense, something to be
additionally wary of, or harder to justify. They are not the same as
harms further from the narrow proportionality limit. In Equality of
Narrow Proportionality Shortfall, this commitment manifests itself in a
concern to fairly distribute the avoidance of these harms, rather than
the harms themselves. In Shifted-Baseline Prioritarianism, this mani-
fests itself in weighting harms closer to the limit more heavily than
those further away.
One implication of this concerns some cases that are, conceptu-
ally and normatively, difficult. The most clear cases for the principle
of necessity – both in terms of whether it applies as a principle, and
in terms of what it recommends – are those in which the exact same
good can be achieved by more or less harm to the same person (i.e.,
what we have called gratuitous harm cases). But there are also cases in
which our options vary both in terms of how much harm and how
much good we will do. For example, consider this case:
Case 14: Attacker threatens Victim with 40 units of harm. Victim can prevent 39 units of harm
by imposing 60 units of harm on Attacker, or she can prevent all 40 units by imposing 70 units of
harm on Attacker. The narrow proportionality limit is 100 units.
In some ways, choosing between these options is clearly an issue for
the principle of necessity. Both options are narrowly proportionate,
so we have a choice between narrowly proportionate options, and it
is necessity’s job to select between such options. But in another way,
it is more like a proportionality calculation. That is because, in
essence, Victim’s decision is whether ten units of additional harm to
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Attacker can be justified to prevent one unit of additional harm to
herself.22
My point here is simply this. If we allow that narrowly propor-
tionate harms are harder to justify the closer to the narrowly pro-
portionate limit they get, this will impact on how we treat such
cases: This isn’t a case of weighing one unit of harm to an innocent
person against ten units of harm to an aggressor, which is how such
cases are usually discussed. It is a case of weighing one unit of harm
to an innocent (which may itself be priority-weighted) against ten
units which range from 40 to 30 in terms of narrow proportionality
shortfall. Keeping the unit of harm to the Victim constant, such a
unit may justify ten units of harm to an additional aggressor who
hasn’t yet been harmed, but may not justify ten units of additional
harm to an aggressor who is already going to receive 60 units from a
limit of 100.
IX. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS
Thus far, I have focussed on simultaneous threat cases: cases in
which a plurality of aggressors poses threats at the same time. In
closing, I’d like to apply some of the lessons that we have drawn
from simultaneous-threat cases to sequential-threat cases.
There is an important puzzle concerning sequential-threat cases.
According to Frances Kamm, there is no limit to the number of
aggressors whom I could kill in order to save my own life. Since
killing in order to fend off each attack, taken on its own, is necessary
and narrowly proportionate, Kamm reasons that there can be no
objection to the collection of defensive actions: ‘One compares the
wrong to be avoided with what would have to be done to each
wrongdoer one at a time, and if there is no violation of propor-
tionality in any individual comparison then there is no violation tout
court.’23
Yet many of us are deeply troubled by the idea that, provided we
can kill one aggressor in order to achieve some goal, we can kill an
infinite number of aggressors in order to achieve that goal. Is there
some way to avoid this implication? There is, of course. Since the
implication arises from the picture of self-defence and war that has
22 Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War’; McMahan, ‘The Limits of Self-Defense’.
23 F.M. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 133–134.
P. TOMLIN
emerged from both ancient and recent scholarship on this issue, we
could rip up this picture and start again, making sure that the new
picture doesn’t have the unpalatable implication that we can kill
infinite aggressors. This is too hasty – this model serves us well in
general, and so we should do all we can to preserve its core con-
ceptual and normative commitments. Ripping it up would be to
throw the baby out with the bathwater. Alternatively, we could
stipulate that one cannot kill an infinite number of aggressors. But
this response is ad hoc.24
To forewarn: I do not claim to solve this puzzle in what follows.
But I do think that what we have learned about liability and necessity
in simultaneous-attack cases might help us with this puzzle.
First, it is important to understand that necessity applies across
attacks and is a moral concern for minimizing harm not just within a
one-to-one relationship but across such relationships. Several
philosophers have suggested that there may be some countervailing
reasons against harming those whom it would be individually nar-
rowly proportionate to harm, but which derive from aggregation of
narrowly proportionate harms. For example, David Rodin argues
that wide proportionality is concerned with the way that harms to
the liable add up, while Jeff McMahan proposes an additional form of
proportionality – proportionality in the aggregate.25 McMahan’s
proposal in particular may seem somewhat mysterious. In defence of
the existence of proportionality in the aggregate, McMahan is unable
to point toward much other than that it gets the intuitively right
answers – in other words, it sails a little too close to the ad hoc
response to the puzzle.
What we have discovered in the present paper is perhaps partial
evidence for the existence of something like proportionality in the
aggregate – there are other elements of defensive morality that work
in similar ways. They constrain harms and dictate choices of harms
between multiple aggressors, even when each harm, were it the only
option, would be proportionate, necessary, and permissible. Neces-
sity reveals a concern for the comparative lessening of such harms.
But wouldn’t it be odd if morality were keen to limit such harm
24 I am grateful to Victor Tadros for discussion which helped me to see these twin dangers.
25 McMahan, ‘Liability, Proportionality, and the Number of Aggressors’; Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’.
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comparatively but not absolutely? If so, proportionality in the
aggregate would seem to be on a somewhat firmer basis.
Relatedly, McMahan in particular takes the apparent one-to-one
nature of liability to be what generates the puzzle. But we now see
that either liability is not one-to-one (if necessity is internal to lia-
bility), or that liability is subject to external checks (if necessity is
external to liability). Therefore, there are other parts of defensive
morality that already operate in ways that are similar to propor-
tionality in the aggregate. This makes McMahan’s response to
Kamm’s puzzle less mysterious.
Second, in addition to these general points about necessity, we
have found a more direct link between necessity and narrow pro-
portionality. Necessity takes account of narrow proportionality. It is
concerned with maximizing narrow proportionality shortfall, and
with its distribution. Here, I think there is potentially the beginnings
of a justification and understanding of the way in which narrowly
proportionate actions can add up to a disproportionate course of
action. Necessity seems to prefer harms further away from the
narrow proportionality threshold than those nearer to it. This sug-
gests that harms close to the narrow proportionality threshold can be
justified, but are worse, harder to justify, or to be avoided more,
than those further away.
My tentative view is that these observations can provide a firmer
backing for the kinds of restrictions on harming responsible threats
articulated by McMahan and Rodin. McMahan’s proportionality in
the aggregate could, I think, be understood as the way in which
narrow proportionality shortfall can aggregate. We have seen that
necessity prefers harms that are a greater distance below the narrow
proportionality line, even if those just under the line could be jus-
tified in a single attacker case. If a series of harms are close to the
line, then the same concerns that motivate necessity’s preference for
harms further away from the line could motivate a concern with the
aggregation of harms close to the line. The thought here is simple:
Necessity is concerned with minimizing ‘only just’ proportionate
harms. If there are differentiations within narrowly proportionate
harms, such that we are concerned with how close to the line harms
get, we might also be concerned with how these harms aggregate.
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In particular, the Shifted-Baseline Priority View would seem to
lessen the gap between narrow and wide proportionality. It doesn’t
eliminate the difference, but it does mean that the two kinds of
proportionality are not as different as may first appear. What narrow
proportionality does, on this view, is (differentially) discount harms
to the potentially liable. These harms still count though – they’re not
morally free shots – and so many harms that are right on the narrow
proportionality threshold can aggregate just as harms to the innocent
can aggregate. This view of narrow proportionality as a progressive
discounting mechanism might therefore provide some backing for
Rodin’s view.
This also would explain why proportionality in the aggregate can
differentiate between culpable and responsible threats. Responsible
and culpable threats are both liable to be killed in order to save a life.
However, we should differentiate between de facto limits to liability
and de jure limits to liability. De facto, the limit will often be the same
– killing is just about the worst thing you can do to a person, and
both are liable to be killed. But culpable aggressors can be liable to
far greater harms than those they threaten to impose on others – for
example, it is proportionate to kill a culpable aggressor to avoid
being paralyzed, even if one will have many good years as a para-
lyzed person. Therefore, the de jure limit to avoid being killed by a
culpable aggressor is far higher than death, and far higher than the de
jure limit on a responsible threat. Therefore, when we kill many
responsible threats, we impart many harms very close to the narrow
proportionality threshold. This is not the case when we kill many
culpable aggressors (if the good at stake is a person’s life). It may be
that there is some limit to the number of culpable aggressors we can
kill to save a single life (I think there is) but it will be far higher than
the number of responsible threats.
I won’t pretend that what I have said in this section is any more
than a sketch of a defence of McMahan’s and Rodin’s responses to
Kamm’s view. But thinking through simultaneous-aggressor cases,
and what we learn about liability, necessity, and narrow propor-
tionality from such cases, certainly makes Kamm’s logic seem less
compelling. In particular, I would now reject the thought that lia-
bility is simply a one-to-one relation, and Kamm’s view seem com-
pelling in part because of that assumption.
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X. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This paper has covered a lot of ground. The common thread
throughout has been thinking about cases involving more than one
attacker, and how we should distribute harms between those
attackers. Consideration of these cases raise major issues in terms of
how to understand the principle of necessity, its relationship to lia-
bility and narrow proportionality, and its scope. In particular, I have
argued for the following:
1. Necessity ought to tell us which of two potentially liable parties to
harm. It follows from this that (a) necessity is either not internal to
liability, or liability is not a one-to-one relation; and (b) if necessity is
external to liability, then necessity, as an external principle, takes ac-
count of the distribution of harms across attackers.
2. Necessity possibly has different components or concerns, or is possibly
an amalgam of distinct principles (for example, avoiding gratuitous
harm, minimizing morally-weighted harm, distributing morally-
weighted harm). Some of these concerns or principles may be internal
to liability (narrow necessity), some external (wide necessity).
3. Once we realise that necessity applies across individuals, it becomes
very difficult to cordon off necessity so that it applies to the choice
between some options and not others. We must either supply a
principled way of restricting necessity’s scope, or accept that it has a far
greater reach than traditionally supposed, not only directing us in how
and whether we go to war to pursue some end, but whether we pursue
that end or another.
4. Necessity should be sensitive to ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’ –
that is, how closely the various harms one is deciding between are to
the narrow proportionality threshold.
5. Necessity should take account of distributive concerns, including the
distribution of narrow proportionality shortfall. I articulated two
principles for doing so, Equality of Narrow Proportionality Shortfall and
Shifted-Baseline Prioritarianism.
6. These findings may help us in thinking about sequential attacks. That
(a) liability is not a one-to-one relation, or morality allows external
checks on liable harms that seek to limit them, and (b) necessity cares
about the distribution of harm and narrow proportionality shortfall,
may provide some support for the idea of ‘proportionality in the
P. TOMLIN
aggregate’ in sequential-attacker cases, a notion which suggests that
you cannot kill an infinite number of liable aggressors if your cause
would allow you to kill one.
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